Copyright © 2026 OyList. All Rights Reserved.
Share
Items20
1
Tommy Koh
Born
Singapore provided the president who steered the final stage of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to its 1982 conclusion. Koh had to work across coastal states, maritime powers and countries seeking a share in ocean resources. His example shows the influence available to a trusted chair: the ability to assemble an acceptable package could matter more than the size of the country behind him.
More about Tommy Koh2
Arvid Pardo
Born
Malta's UN ambassador put the deep seabed on the international agenda in 1967, arguing that its resources should be treated as a common inheritance rather than claimed by the strongest states. That principle entered the later Law of the Sea Convention. Pardo illustrates agenda-setting by a small state, while the final compromise also shows how an ambitious proposal can be narrowed as other governments negotiate its meaning.
More about Arvid Pardo3
Satya Nandan
Born
Fiji's Nandan chaired the informal group that negotiated the 1994 agreement revising how the Law of the Sea Convention's seabed provisions would operate. His detailed work helped bridge disagreement over the regime after the original treaty had already been adopted. Read him alongside Pardo: establishing a principle and designing arrangements that more governments will accept are different diplomatic tasks.
More about Satya Nandan4
Rena Lee
As president of the negotiations on biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, Singapore's Lee helped bring the high-seas agreement to a concluded text in 2023. The discussions combined conservation, marine genetic resources and the interests of states with very different scientific capacities. Her contribution lies in keeping that package negotiable across those divisions, rather than representing the victory of one national position.
More about Rena Lee5
Christiana Figueres
Born
The Costa Rican diplomat led the UN climate secretariat during the rebuilding of negotiations after Copenhagen and through the 2015 Paris Agreement. Her role was international, not that of Costa Rica's national negotiator: cultivating confidence and cooperation among governments helped make a common text possible. She is a useful reminder that small-country diplomats can gain influence through institutions as well as through their own delegations.
More about Christiana Figueres6
Tony deBrum
Born
The Marshall Islands' foreign minister helped bring vulnerable island states and much larger economies into the High Ambition Coalition at the Paris climate talks. That cross-regional grouping pressed for a stronger agreement, including attention to the 1.5-degree temperature goal. His distinctive tactic was to build support beyond the states facing similar risks, turning an island country's concern into a wider negotiating demand.
More about Tony deBrum7
Pa Ousman Jarju
The Gambia's climate envoy and minister worked through the Least Developed Countries Group and co-facilitated a working group on action before 2020 at the Paris talks. He described the temperature goal, loss and damage, and recognition of poorer states' needs as gains from sustained diplomatic engagement. His place here is about pooled negotiating capacity: a coalition could press concerns that one small delegation would struggle to keep on the agenda alone.
More about Pa Ousman Jarju8
David Donoghue
Ireland's UN ambassador co-facilitated the negotiations on the 2030 Agenda with Kenya's Macharia Kamau, reaching agreement among all UN member states in 2015. The task was to hold together a development programme spanning poverty, inequality and environmental protection. Donoghue's contribution is a clear example of shared chairmanship: a small state's influence grew through partnership and procedural trust, without ownership of the resulting agenda.
More about David Donoghue9
Csaba Kőrösi
Hungary's Kőrösi co-chaired the Open Working Group that prepared the Sustainable Development Goals, working with Kenya's Macharia Kamau before the final 2030 Agenda negotiations. Their job was to turn broad consultations into a workable proposal. Comparing him with Donoghue makes the sequence visible: developing the goals and securing the wider political agreement required successive teams, not one decisive summit performance.
More about Csaba Kőrösi10
Don MacKay
New Zealand's MacKay chaired the committee that completed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2006, after leading the working group behind an earlier draft. Disabled people's organisations were participants in shaping the process, not merely its beneficiaries. His example shows a small delegation gaining authority through drafting and inclusive negotiation, while the convention's adoption still left governments with the work of implementation.
More about Don MacKay11
Dáithí Ó Ceallaigh
Ireland's ambassador presided over the Dublin conference that negotiated the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008. His consolidated draft gave states a basis for agreement after intensive consultations, within a wider effort involving governments and campaigners. The value of this case is practical chairmanship: producing a text that could hold a coalition together while preserving the prohibition at the centre of its purpose.
More about Dáithí Ó Ceallaigh12
Christian Wenaweser
Born
The Liechtenstein diplomat presided over the 2010 Kampala review conference, where states agreed amendments defining the crime of aggression and conditions for the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction. The deal did not give the court immediate, universal power to prosecute aggression. Wenaweser's example is a negotiated institutional advance whose compromises and later activation steps are part of the achievement, rather than details to overlook.
More about Christian Wenaweser13
Joseph Bech
Luxembourg's foreign minister chaired the 1955 Messina conference, which helped restart European integration and led towards the Treaties of Rome. The Benelux countries brought a joint memorandum, giving their proposals more weight than three separate appeals might have carried. This is a regional agreement with wider consequences: Bech shows how a small state can shape the direction of negotiations by building a compact coalition first.
More about Joseph Bech14
Johan Beyen
Born
The Dutch foreign minister pressed for a general common market when European integration risked remaining a series of separate sectoral projects. Working with his Belgian and Luxembourg counterparts, he helped put that approach into the Benelux initiative considered at Messina in 1955. His contribution is useful for understanding coalition design: pooling smaller countries' proposals gave a substantive alternative a place in the negotiations leading to Rome.
More about Johan Beyen15
Frank Aiken
Born
Ireland's foreign minister repeatedly promoted non-proliferation resolutions at the United Nations from 1958, helping prepare the ground for the later Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. He could not dictate a bargain to the nuclear powers. His influence came from keeping a proposal before other states and assembling support over time, a route to relevance that did not depend on military strength.
More about Frank Aiken16
Elayne Whyte Gómez
Costa Rica's Whyte Gómez presided over the 2017 conference that negotiated the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The process brought together a large group of states and civil-society participants around the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. It illustrates coalition-based law-making outside the nuclear powers' preferred framework, while the absence of those powers limits what adoption itself could accomplish.
More about Elayne Whyte Gómez17
Alexander Kmentt
Born
The Austrian diplomat helped develop the humanitarian initiative behind the nuclear prohibition treaty, including the Vienna conference and Humanitarian Pledge. Those efforts drew a broad group of states towards a common demand before formal treaty negotiations. His role shows how a smaller country can organise the preparatory coalition, with advocacy and conference design creating opportunities that later negotiators must turn into legal text.
More about Alexander Kmentt18
Jaap Ramaker
Born
The Dutch diplomat chaired the final year of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty negotiations in 1996 and produced compromise text for a deeply divided process. A chair from a smaller country could offer a focal point between states with competing security interests. The treaty's continuing entry-into-force obstacle also marks the limit of that influence: an agreed text did not remove the need for further national ratifications.
More about Jaap Ramaker19
Vangelis Vitalis
While representing New Zealand at the World Trade Organization, Vitalis chaired agriculture negotiations in a personal capacity and helped draft the 2015 Nairobi decision to eliminate agricultural export subsidies. That technical role put him inside a bargain involving far larger economies. His example is about expertise converted into negotiating influence, without implying that one subsidy decision resolved all the inequalities in agricultural trade.
More about Vangelis Vitalis20
Jan Eliasson
Sweden's Eliasson led consultations as UN General Assembly president on the proposal that became the Human Rights Council in 2006. His task was to find enough support for replacing an institution whose credibility had been badly damaged. This was agreement on an institutional framework, not agreement on every human-rights dispute; it shows both the reach and the limits of an elected chair's convening authority.
More about Jan Eliasson
